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ABSTRACT 
Research Question 
The present study examines cross-national and sectoral differences in 
multifactor productivity growth in sixteen European countries from 1995 to 
2005. The main aim is to ascertain the role of flexible employment contracts 
and collective labour relationships in explaining the ample differentials 
recorded in the European economy. 
Research Findings  
We use the EU KLEMS database for growth accounting and a broad set of 
indicators of labour regulations, covering two distinct ‘areas’ of labour 
regulation: employment laws and collective relations laws. This comprehensive 
approach allow us to consider arrangements that regulate allocation of labour 
inputs (fixed-term, part-time contracts, hours worked) and of payoff and 
decision rights of employees.  
We find that, since 1995, European countries have not followed similar 
patterns of growth. A large number of variations between European economies 
are caused by deep differentials in multifactor productivity and part of this 
heterogeneity is caused by sectoral diversities. We show that, in labour-
intensive sectors such as services, fixed-term contracts, which imply shorter-
term jobs and lower employment tenures, may discourage investment in skills 
and have detrimental effects on multifactor productivity increases. We also 
find that some forms of labour regulation and arrangements that give a ‘voice’ 
to employees mitigate these perverse effects on efficiency patterns.  
Policy Implications  
Employment protection reforms which slacken the rules of fixed-term contracts 
cause potential drawbacks in terms of low productivity gains. More stringent 
regulation of these practices, as well as a climate of collective relations, sustain 
long-term relationships and mitigate these negative effects. 
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1. Introduction1 
Over the past decade, disappointing productivity growth has been recorded in 
the European economy and the catching-up of Europe on the U.S. has slowed 
significantly. Productivity differentials have mainly involved market services. 
Indeed, new research (van Ark et al. 2008) sheds some light on differential 
patterns of growth in labour-intensive sectors, such as services, in explaining 
the different performances of multifactor productivity recorded between the 
European economy and the US. These findings encourage further inquiry into 
the role of management of labour resources and their regulation in explaining 
successes or failures in Europe.  
As known, various hypotheses on the role of labour regulation have been 
advocated, and their relevance has been tested in a growing number of 
empirical studies. Many investigations analyse the impact of these policies on 
employment and unemployment rates, or on unemployment inflows and 
outflows, but reserve less space for productivity growth. Conversely, the 
present paper examines the more controversial issue of the impact of labour 
institutions on productivity outcomes, only recently addressed by some country 
studies (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2008), or industry-level cross-country 
research (Micco and Pages 2006; Bassanini and Venn 2007; Bassanini, 
Nunziata and Venn 2008)2.  
The theoretical investigation of the role of labour market institutions on 
productivity is ambiguous and mainly limited to the influence of firing 
restrictions. Scarce attention is devoted to fixed-term contacts.  
The deeper motives for promoting labour market flexibility are found in the 
theoretical literature on the potential costs of labour protection. Such a 
protection, as argued by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), perturbs the 
reallocation of resources from declining firms to more dynamic ones and with 
above average productivity growth. In addition, these protective devices alter 
allocation of resources among sectors.  
                                               
1A first version of this paper has been presented at 10th Bi-annual Conference of the 
European Association for Comparative Economic Studies - EACES (Higher School of 
Economics, Moscow, August 28-30, 2008). 
2
 These recent works, which examine country and sectoral differentials, use a cross-
country approach and verify differences across sectors with a ‘difference in difference’ 
method.  
 3 
Economies with rigid labour markets undergo a distortion in their innovation 
activities, since they adopt mainly secondary innovations, which cause a cost 
reduction in existing goods, but they do not experiment with primary 
innovations, such as those related to new products, featuring higher returns but 
also higher variance (Saint Paul, 2002)3. Such economies, prevailing in Europe, 
show an international specialization in secure goods, at an advanced stage of 
their product life-cycle, and this contributes toward explaining why “Europe 
appears as less high tech than the United States” (Saint Paul, 2002, p. 376) and 
why it falls behind in terms of long-run productivity growth.  
Other key channels to explain unfavourable consequences are related to capital 
returns and worker effort. Returns to investment are lowered by job protection 
provisions, as shown by Bertola (1994). Analogous negative impacts are 
detectable on worker incentives since labour protection lowers disciplinary 
layoff probabilities; hence, under less threat of dismissals, opportunistic 
behaviour is encouraged (Boeri, Jimeno, 2005). 
By contrast, theoretical arguments in favour of employee protection are based 
on positive effects on productivity due to long-term relationships and workers' 
incentives on skill upgrading. Two main channels might be advocated. First, 
labour policies may increase the stock of human capital through their beneficial 
influence on firm and worker incentives in training. Second, for a given stock 
of human capital, “policies that reduce social conflict might condition workers’ 
effort and their willingness.” (OECD, 2007, p.65) 
In this vein, Nickell and Layard (1999) signal that employment protection has a 
positive effect, because it increases job tenure and incentives on-the-job 
training. Belot, Boone and van Ours (2007) also show that, when effort and 
investments in human capital are non-contractible, a positive level of 
employment protection solves hold-up problems; such a protection encourages 
employees to invest in match-specific human capital by increasing the 
probability of the survival of the match, and this beneficial effect is stronger in 
                                               
3
 As documented by Saint Paul (2002), “That Europe tends to innovate more in 
established products than in new ones is evident from the data. For example, in 1993 
the US accounted for 54% of world patents in biotechnology, 51% in computers, and 
32% in communication, versus 13%, 14% and 13%, respectively, for France plus 
Germany. By contrast, these two countries accounted for 25% of world patents in 
instruments, 25% in construction, and 52% in transportation, versus 6%, 5% and 3% 
for the US” (Saint-Paul, 2002, p.376). 
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those sectors where firm specialization in competences is more important. 
However, there is a trade-off between these positive effects and the negative 
consequences due to firing costs implied by employment protection. In any 
case, the final effect is a strictly positive optimal level of employment 
protection, which is influenced by some other institutions, such as those 
determining wage setting. In addition, Wasmer (2002) shows that different 
levels of employment protection have an impact on the mix of skills: low levels 
favour general portable skills, higher levels determine firm-specific skills.4  
Institutional interactions reveal of strategical importance. Some 
complementarities are related to the wage-setting system. A limited 
discretionality of employees in wage setting lead them to adjust employment 
levels, and only protective provisions make union wage bargaining power 
effective; it explains why employment protection and unions are quite often 
complementary institutions, since binding rules on employment contracts may 
be useless if firms could freely adjust wages downwards (Boeri and Van Ours, 
2008, chapter 13). 
On the other hand, collective bargaining rules and sectoral agreements which 
generate low spreads between firms may prevent opportunistic behaviour by 
employers when on-the-job training is observable, but not verifiable. In such 
circumstances, workers may accept a wage cut with a promise of obtaining on-
the-job training, but the firm has an incentive to renege on its promise and 
reaps some gains from cheap labour (Malcomson, 1999). Institutional 
constraints on wage setting, more enforceable if collective contracts are 
extended by law to third parties at national or sectoral level, thus impede hold-
up and generate upgrading of skills5.  
Other links with incentive schemes are provided by efficiency wage models. 
As shown by Güell (2000), the choice of fixed-term contracts is plausible in a 
context of efficiency wages, but only if there is a sufficiently high renewal rate 
                                               
4From a welfare point of view, under imperfect insurance markets, some components 
of firing costs, such as severance payments, may be justified when employees are risk-
averse (Pissarides, 2001). 
5
 In our analysis, we introduced an indicator for collective rules which takes into 
account whether the law extends collective contracts to third parties at national or 
sectoral level. Other wage constraints are represented by minimum wages. As is 
known, minimum wages improve incentives for investing in training, partly because 
they reduce demand for unskilled workers, who have greater incentives to invest in 
training to avoid unemployment. High unemployment benefits, however, may offset 
this effect by reducing the opportunity cost of remaining unemployed. 
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of fixed-term contracts into permanent ones; otherwise, shirking is always 
strictly preferred. “The idea behind is very simple: if a worker always becomes 
unemployed independently of the effort expended, there is no way to give 
incentives to the worker by paying him a higher wage” (Güell, 2000, p.10).  
In a context of asymmetric information, other institutional complementarities 
arise and are related to the role of works councils and the presence of 
employees on supervisory boards. As shown by Freeman and Lazear (1994), 
management uses information strategically, declaring bad states of the firm to 
extract more effort from employees; in their turn, employees, knowing this, 
disregard management and rationally choose low-effort strategies6. Legal 
requirements and elected works councils solve this communication problem, 
since they give rise to a high degree of disclosure, inducing more effort; the 
effectiveness of this remedy is higher when the difference between 
compensations in the firm and outside options is positively affected by specific 
human capital. Freeman and Lazear also argue that, by enhancing job security, 
employees assign higher value to expected future profits, have greater loyalty, 
and invest more in firm-specific skills. 
In sum, this brief excursus shows that multiple dimensions of labour regulation 
must be taken into account and that their impact contributes to explaining 
national and sectoral disparities in productivity growth. 
In the present paper, we analyse these disparities in Europe and then focus on 
some driving forces such as flexible employment contracts and collective 
labour regulation to explain various patterns of multifactor productivity. As 
said above, other recent studies examine the influence of labour protection on 
productivity and focus most of their analysis on dismissal rules, with some 
extensions to other forms of regulation (see, for instance, Bassanini, Nunziata 
and Venn, 2008). The present paper does not consider rules on firing 
restrictions and mainly examines only those norms that increases flexibility at 
the margin; on the other hand it focus on those institutional devices which 
involve co-decision making and verify the role of co-management when works 
councils and co determination rules devices apply. 
                                               
6
 This occurs when employees choose a high effort level only in bad states, when low 
effort does not allow firms to survive and workers rationally expect to lose their jobs. 
Vice-versa, in good states, they obtain higher utility with low-effort strategies. 
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In order to obtain a comprehensive database, we considered two distinct ‘areas’ 
of labour regulation, employment laws and collective relations laws7. 
Concerning the first, we selected some indexes which summarise the regulation 
of allocation of labour inputs in the productive process: part-time, fixed-term 
contracts, hours worked.8 For the second area, collective relations, we included 
not only payoff rights, but also workers’ decision rights, which may have some 
impact on productivity. For instance, computing the presence of employees in 
worker councils or on boards of directors yields a more precise evaluation of 
arrangements that give a ‘voice’ to employees and which may represent 
additional channels influencing productivity9. 
The second set of information is on growth and is gathered from the EU 
KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts. This database is the outcome of a 
research project, financed by the European Commission and aimed at analysing 
productivity in the European Union (Timmer et al. 2007). It allows a detailed 
analysis of European economies and explicitly considers important issues such 
as average skills of the labour force, capital services in information and 
communication technology, and their diversities across sectors and countries. 
By merging statistical information made available by these two sets of 
databases, with additional data from EUROSTAT, as described in Section 2, 
we explore the potential impact of labour regulation on productivity 
performances for a sample of European Economy countries for the period 
1995-2005. 
                                               
7
 Botero et al. (2004) compare their database with that sponsored by other institutions, 
such as the OECD and World Bank, as follows: “What distinguishes our data from 
previous efforts is a combination of a significant coverage of countries and a 
comprehensive approach to labor market regulations” (p. 1341).  
8
 The dataset used in our study includes some measures which reflect the binding rules 
governing individual labour contracts which do not exactly coincide with those 
provided by the OECD and specifically aimed at measuring employment protection. 
Note that, according to the OECD employment protection indicator (EPL index), the 
strictness of employment protection consists of three different summary indicators 
which refer, respectively, to regular employment, temporary employment and 
collective dismissals. A detailed description of the method adopted to obtain these 
three summary indicators is given in OECD (2004, Chapter 2). In our case, we include 
rules on part-time contracts and hours worked, which are not considered in the OECD 
EPL index.  
9
 A third indicator that measures various social security provisions, introduced by 
Botero et al. (2004), was not been included in our analysis.  
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides data description. Section 
3 presents our main findings on country-sectoral growth differentials and 
labour arrangements. Section 4 offers econometric estimates. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Data Description 
As mentioned above, our empirical investigation relies on several databases, 
EU KLEMS accounts, the indexes on employments laws and collective 
relations elaborated by Botero et al. (2004)10, and EUROSTAT.  
The first step of our research involved matching them and achieving a 
disaggregated analysis at sector and country levels. First, the availability of 
data and the needs of a large and consistent sector-country profile led us to 
select only 16 countries out of the 27 European Union members and to re-
arrange the NACE rev.1 sections into 8 industries. This made it possible to 
compare the following economies: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and United Kingdom. This country 
selection, dictated by data availability, permitted to include two sets of 
countries: i) 13 Old Member States; ii) 3 New Member States. The second set 
is quite heterogeneous and includes Hungary and Czech Republic, two “market 
oriented” economies, with some similarities with the Anglo Saxon countries, 
and Slovenia, a country which has adopted some institutions which are typical 
of the German model (European Commission, 2004)11. 
                                               
10
 Botero et al. (2004) contributes to the growing literature which maintains the 
causality link between ‘law and finance’ and which supports the thesis that insufficient 
shareholder protection causes ownership concentration of low degrees of 
capitalization (La Porta et al., 1998). The legal origin hypothesis has recently been 
applied to labour regulation by Botero et al., (2004), whose main statement dictates 
that ‘the historical origin of a country’s laws shapes its regulation of labour and other 
markets’ (Botero et al., 2004, p.1340). In our work, more than adopting these 
propositions, we simply use the database elaborated by this study. 
11 Of the new Member States, Slovenia is one of the countries with above-average 
unionization levels, with a works council system, ( replacing the former Jugoslavian 
model of worker self determination) and with national cross sectors bargaining over 
pay and working coditions.At the same time, in Slovenia,  new legislation has been 
introduced in 2003 “which seeks to regulate temporary agency work, increase the 
flexibility of the Slovenian labour market and provide adequate protection for 
temporary agency workers, increase the flexibility of the Slovenian labour market and 
provide adequate protection for temporary agency workers” (European Commission, 
2004, p. 64) As a result, Slovenia recorded a more systematic use of such employment 
contracts.  
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The selected sectors consist of: 1) Primary Sector (agriculture, mining and 
quarrying), 2) Industry (manufacturing and energy sectors), 3) Construction, 4) 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, 5) Hotels and Restaurants, 6) Transport, Storage 
and Communications, 7) Financial Intermediation, Real Estate and Business 
Services, 8) Community, Social and Personal Services. 
We drew the dependent variable of our econometric estimates, the Multi-Factor 
Productivity (MFP) growth, from the EU KLEMS database, which was 
extensively used in the study of van Ark et al. (2008). One of the main 
advantages offered by this database is the detailed breakdown of industries and 
service sectors and the decomposition of labour productivity; it is also worth 
noting that this decomposition was computed by considering differences in 
labour quality (high skilled, medium-skilled and low-skilled) and a full variety 
of asset types (distinction between ICT capital and non-ICT capital services). 
Other variables used in the descriptive analysis, see Section 3, value added and 
the contribution of inputs to growth, were also obtained from the EU KLEMS 
database. 
Some explanatory variables of MFP, particularly those describing unmeasured 
innovative input and the quantitative dimension of labour market flexibility, 
were taken from the EUROSTAT database. More precisely: sectoral R&D 
expenses, standardised to value added, were used as a proxy of innovation12.  
The set of variables related to labour arrangements and institutions consists of 
two main groups. The first, taken from the EUROSTAT database, includes the 
rate of changes of employees with fixed-term contracts and with part-time 
contracts and the rate of growth of weekly worked hours; all these variables 
offer a measure of the actual degrees of labour flexibility changes.  
The second group consists of two subgroups of labour regulation: employment 
laws and collective relations laws.  
In details, for employment laws, we considered the existence and cost of 
alternative arrangements to standard employment contracts, such as fixed-term 
and part-time contracts (extensive margin flexibility)13, and the cost of 
                                               
12
 Unfortunately, EUROSTAT data on R&D were not available for all 128 (16 
countries time 8 sectors) sector-country observations.  
13
 More precisely, the existence and cost of part-time contracts were computed as the 
average of 1) a dummy variable equal to one, if part-time workers enjoy the 
mandatory benefits of full-time workers, 2) a dummy variable equal to one, if 
terminating part-time workers is at least as costly as terminating full-time workers. 
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increasing the number of hours worked (intensive margin flexibility).14 In 
addition, we consider the binding role of these employment laws, which is 
obtained under the assumption that provisions regulating employment contracts 
are more stringent in those sectors where propensities to use flexible 
employment arrangements are higher. These propensities are in turn identified 
by the share of flexible arrangements (incidence of fixed-term and part-time 
contracts). Hence, we assumed that the protection of workers is more binding 
in those sectors where, respectively, the proportions of fixed-term and part-
time employees on total employees are higher. 
This methodology, following Bassanini and Venn (2007) and Bassanini, 
Nunziata and Venn (2008), permits to solve the problem that labour market 
policies are typically defined at country level, whereas we wished to make 
country-sector level comparisons. Along similar lines, we considered that, in 
each sector, the higher the actual increase of weekly hours worked, the more 
important the impact of costs of increasing the number of hours worked15.  
The second subgroup is related to collective relation indexes: i) labour union 
power, which measures the statutory protection and bargaining power of 
unions16; ii) the collective disputes index, which refers to the protection of 
workers during collective disputes17. As regards the binding role of labour 
                                                                                                                                       
The existence and cost of fixed-term contracts were computed as the average of 1) a 
dummy variable equal to one, if fixed-term contracts were only allowed for fixed-term 
tasks and 2) the normalised maximum duration of fixed-term contracts. 
14
 Botero et al. (2004) computed the maximum number of “normal” hours of work per 
year in each country (excluding overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.). When the hours 
worked exceed this maximum, a firm uses overtime. The cost of increasing hours 
worked is computed as the ratio of the final total wage bill to the initial one. 
15
 In our study the role of separation costs is only captured by In our study the role of 
separation costs is only captured by sector and countries dummies.  
16
 This is computed as the average of the following seven dummy variables which are 
one: 1) if employees have the right to unionise, 2) if employees have the right to 
collective bargaining, 3) if employees have the legal duty to bargain with unions, 4) if 
collective contracts are extended to third parties by law, 5) if the law allows closed 
shops, 6) if workers, or unions, or both, have the right to appoint members to the 
Boards of Directors, 7) if workers’ councils are mandated by law.  
17
 This indicator is computed as the average of the following eight dummy variables 
which are one: 1) if employer lockouts are illegal, 2) if workers have the right to 
industrial action, 3) if wildcat, political, and sympathy/solidarity/ secondary strikes are 
legal, 4) if there is no mandatory waiting period or notification requirement before 
strikes can occur, 5) if striking is legal even if there is a collective agreement in force, 
6) if laws do not mandate conciliation procedures before a strike, 7) if third-party 
arbitration during a labour dispute is mandated by law, 8) if it is illegal to fire or 
replace striking workers. 
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union power and collective disputes indicators, we weighted them at sectoral 
level, by considering respectively the component of dependent employees on 
total employment and the share of employees involved in collective disputes. 
3. Growth accounting in the European Economy: 1995-2005 
3.1 The EU/US comparison  
Since the mid 1990s, the 15 European Union countries recorded a decline in 
productivity growth, from an average annual value of 2.4 percent, during the 
previous years 1973-1995, to 1.5 during the period 1995-2006. The slowdown 
seems even more remarkable in comparison with the American experience, 
where a reverse trend of acceleration was observable: in the US, average 
annual labour productivity passed from 1.2 percent in 1973-1995 to 2.3 percent 
from 1995 to 2006 (van Ark et al. 2008).  
By definition, labour productivity is obtained by the difference between the 
rates of growth of output and of labour input. From this accounting, the gap of 
Europe with respect to the US was due not only to a lower increase in real 
output, but also to an increase in the growth rates of total hours worked (from -
0.4 in the years from 1974-1994 to +0.9 in 1995-2006). The rise of European 
labour utilisation was not accompanied by similar trends in the American 
economy, which underwent a falling increase in hours worked, from +1.6 in 
the first period to +0.9 in the second one).  
The second finding obtained by growth accounting is related to the breakdown 
of labour productivity. By following Solow (1957), together with proper 
refinements which take into account the heterogeneity of the labour force as 
well as the distinction between ICT and non-ICT capital per hour, one has the 
following: 
Labour Productivity= Labour Composition + ICT capital per hour + 
+ Non-ICT capital per hour  + MFP 
 
where the last component, MFP, is multifactor productivity, the share of output 
growth not attributable to inputs. Applying these accounting rules and using the 
new EU KLEMS database, which makes it possible for the first time to detect 
the role of high-skilled labour and information and communications technology 
capital, van Ark et al. (2008) identified some crucial results.  
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Table 1: Labour productivity in the market economy: EU economies and 
the US, 1995-2004 
 
Labour 
Productivity 
1=2+3+4+5 
Labour 
composition 
2 
ICT cap. 
per hour 
3 
Non ICT capit. 
per hour 
4 
Multifactor 
productivity 
5 
European Union 1.5 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 
US 3.0 0.3 0.8 0.4 1.4 
Standard Dev. 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.0 
Source: EU KLEMS data base, van Ark et al. (2008, Table 4). 
 
As Table 1 shows, neither a worsening effect in labour force skills (component 
2) nor in a decline in capital deepening (component 4) may be considered as 
the main determinants of the slowdown in European productivity growth. On 
the contrary, the disappointing performances of the European countries were 
mainly due to the lower growth of ICT investments and MFP.  
In addition, it must be emphasised that a significant component of the 
productivity gap was attributable to the services sector. Indeed, at a sectoral 
level of analysis, the services sector, representing nearly half of the market 
economy, explained a large proportion of the productivity gap between Europe 
and the US. 
 
Table 2: Major sector contribution to average annual labour productivity 
growth: market economy, 1995-2004 
 
Market 
economy 
ICT 
production 
Goods 
production 
Market 
services Reallocation 
European Union 1.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 -0.2 
US 3.0 0.9 0.7 1.8 -0.3 
Source: EU KLEMS data base, van Ark et al. (2008, Table 5) 
 
But is the European scenario homogeneous or there are large variations 
between countries? 
 
3.2 European cross- country differentials  
 
Our analysis offers some answers and provides a growth accounting for some 
countries of the European Union from 1995 to 2005. 
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Table 3 provides a synthetic picture and shows: i) the growth rate of the GDP 
and its decomposition into hours and productivity growth; ii) the 
decomposition of productivity growth into its main contributions18.  
Our main findings for EU13 show that the lowest position was occupied by 
Italy, in terms of growth of value added (column 1), mainly due to its collapse 
in productivity growth. It is followed by Germany where, however, the 
disappointing performance of output growth was primarily caused by a marked 
fall in hours worked. Conversely, at the top we find Finland and Spain, but 
here too the difference between the two economies is remarkable since Finland 
recorded an acceleration in productivity gains, whereas Spain had extensive 
growth, due only to increasing utilisation of hours worked. 
 
Table 3: Contributions to Growth in Real Value-Added: European Economy, 
1995-2005 
  
Output contribution 
from Labour productivity contributions from  
 
Growth 
rate of 
Value 
Added 
Hours 
Worked 
Labour 
Productivity 
Labour 
Composition 
ICT capital 
per Hour 
Non-ICT 
capital per 
our 
TFP 
LP 
contributions 
from 
knowledge 
economy 
Austria 2.19 0.45 1.74 0.25 0.47 0.42 0.60 1.31 
Belgium 2.04 0.58 1.46 0.21 0.79 0.72 -0.26 0.74 
Denmark 1.81 0.52 1.28 0.23 0.84 0.37 -0.17 0.90 
Finland 3.42 0.79 2.63 0.22 0.52 0.46 1.43 2.17 
France 2.09 0.24 1.84 0.37 0.30 0.57 0.60 1.27 
Germany 1.32 -0.23 1.55 0.01 0.40 0.69 0.46 0.86 
Ireland 7.26 1.94 5.31 0.55 0.46 3.47 0.82 1.84 
Italy 1.18 0.55 0.64 0.17 0.25 0.68 -0.46 -0.04 
Netherlands 2.51 0.64 1.87 0.35 0.55 0.51 0.45 1.36 
Portugal 2.18 0.45 1.72 0.22 0.73 1.57 -0.80 0.15 
Spain 3.44 1.96 1.48 0.43 0.42 1.42 -0.78 0.07 
Sweden 2.87 0.19 2.67 0.27 0.44 1.04 0.91 1.62 
United Kingdom 2.72 0.57 2.15 0.44 0.77 0.62 0.31 1.52 
Average (UE13) 2.69 0.67 2.03 0.29 0.54 0.96 0.24 1.06 
Std. Dev. (UE13) 1.54 0.62 1.12 0.14 0.19 0.84 0.68 0.69 
Czech Republic 2.09 -0.33 2.41 0.28 0.62 1.42 0.10 1.00 
Hungary 4.21 0.27 3.92 0.68 0.27 0.30 2.67 3.62 
Slovenia 3.88 -0.27 4.13 0.71 0.45 2.14 0.82 1.99 
Average (UE16) 2.83 0.52 2.30 0.34 0.52 1.03 0.42 1.28 
Std. Dev.(UE16) 1.42 0.63 1.18 0.18 0.18 0.81 0.84 0.88 
 
Source: our elaborations on EU KLEMS database. 
                                               
18See Appendix, Figure A1 for hours and productivity growth by sector and country. 
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Table 3 shows that the slow productivity growth of the old member states of 
the European Union, below 2 percent, is a widespread phenomenon, with some 
leading exceptions, two in the Northern Continental Europe, Finland and 
Sweden, and two in the Anglo-Saxon economies, Ireland and the UK.  
In addition, for the same group of four successful cases, the differentials in 
contribution to growth are impressive. Focusing on these four countries and 
considering the importance of the various components, gave rise to Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Contributions to labour productivity growth, 1995-2005 
Finland
Labour Composition
ICT capital per Hour 
Non-ICT capital per
our 
MFP 
Sweden
Labour Composition
ICT capital per Hour 
Non-ICT capital per
our 
MFP 
C
 
Ireland
Labour Composition
ICT capital per Hour 
Non-ICT capital per
our 
MFP 
United Kingdom
Labour Composition
ICT capital per Hour 
Non-ICT capital per
our 
MFP 
  
Source: our elaborations on EU KLEMS database. 
 
The four successful cases tell different stories. In Ireland, a significant increase 
in substitution of capital for labour and processes of deepening in (non-ICT) 
capital intensity are recorded. This path is quite similar to the catching-up 
process on the US which, on average, European countries experienced from the 
mid-1970s to the late 1980s. For the other Anglo-Saxon country, the UK, the 
contribution of two components of knowledge economy (high quality of labour 
workforce and capital ICT services) are important. Lastly, the Northern 
countries, Finland, in particular, were the only economies in Europe which 
show the definite incidence of multifactor productivity growth.  
One expected hypothesis is that a traditional catch-up pattern explains 
productivity growth within Europe, and that this process is more evident in a 
disaggregation by broad sectors. This analysis can reveal that, in each industry, 
higher labour productivity growth is recorded in those countries with lower 
levels of efficiency and as the result of adaptation and imitation of foreign 
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technology. But a simple graphical representation (Figure 2) shows that a 
negative correlation between levels and growth rates, and therefore a catch up 
process, is significant only in two sectors: i) Wholesale and Retail Trade; ii) 
and Financial Intermediation, Real Estate and Business Services, with a 
coefficient of correlation in both cases around -0.45 and significant at the 10% 
level. 
Table 3 also summarises contributions to labour productivity growth, which 
reveal cross-country diversities. To better evaluate the relative importance of 
the various components, we computed their percentage contributions to labour 
productivity, as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Contributions to labour productivity growth in European 
Economy, 1995-2005 
 
Labour 
Composition 
ICT 
capital 
per Hour 
Non-ICT 
capital per 
our 
TFP 
Austria 14.47 26.85 24.29 34.39 
Belgium 14.27 54.57 49.28 -18.12 
Denmark 18.29 66.03 29.13 -13.45 
Finland 8.38 19.83 17.35 54.45 
France 20.17 16.33 30.88 32.62 
Germany 0.36 25.82 44.33 29.49 
Ireland 10.44 8.68 65.35 15.52 
Italy 26.26 39.70 106.42 -72.37 
Netherlands 18.94 29.61 27.40 24.04 
Portugal 12.82 42.64 91.02 -46.47 
Spain 29.25 28.00 95.43 -52.68 
Sweden 10.27 16.58 39.14 34.02 
United Kingdom 20.45 35.84 29.07 14.64 
Average (UE13) 15.72 31.58 49.93 2.77 
Std. Dev. (UE13) 7.71 16.11 29.99 39.64 
Czech Republic 11.71 25.51 58.76 4.02 
Hungary 17.21 6.88 7.74 68.17 
Slovenia 17.22 10.95 51.87 19.97 
Average (UE16) 15.66 28.36 47.97 8.01 
Std. Dev.(UE16) 6.99 16.37 28.97 39.15 
 
Source: our elaborations on EU KLEMS database 
 
The first result is that the main difference arising in the EU-US comparison and 
attributable to MFP (see Table 1), is confirmed in the intra-European context: 
the main disparity in labor productivity growth between individual European 
economies is to be found not in differences in the intensity of the production 
factors, but in multifactor productivity. Indeed, the standard deviation of MFP 
(39.15%) is quite larger than that of the contribution of labour composition 
(6.99%) or of capital deepening ICT (16.37%) (see Table 4).  
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This motivates to extend the analysis of MFP in terms of country-sectoral 
differentials. 
 
3.3 Multifactor productivity growth: national/sectoral differentials 
Multifactor productivity growth measures the efficiency improvements in the 
use of inputs; in other terms, it measures the reduction in input costs to produce 
a given amount of output. This measure reflects disembodied technical 
changes, i.e., those changes not embodied in the quality of inputs.  
More precisely, MFP growth ( Aln∆ ) is calculated as the real growth of output 
minus a weighted growth of inputs: 
ijtLijtijtKijtijtXijtijtij LvKvXvYA lnlnlnlnln ∆−∆−∆−∆=∆  
where ∆ lnYijt , ∆ ln Xijt , ∆ ln Kijt  and ∆ ln Lijt denote, respectively, the growth 
of output (Y), intermediate inputs (X), capital (K) and labour (L) in country i 
and sector j, between t-1 and t, while Xijtv , Kijtv  and Lijtv  are the two period 
average shares of inputs, X, K and L, respectively, on total output. 
As clearly described by Inklaar et al. (2008, p. 148-149), many factors may 
cause changes in MFP, since this residual measure includes pure technological 
change, organizational improvements and effects from unmeasured output and 
inputs that could be captured by R&D expenses. Hence, in addition to technical 
innovation, there are i) effects due to organisational and institutional changes, 
ii) shifts in returns to scale, iii) any other deviations from competitive 
assumptions of equalities between prices and marginal costs; iv) all computing 
errors due to the existence of unmeasured inputs.  
All these effects may have different impacts at country and sectoral level, as 
shown in Figure 3. The first result is that the main difference arising in the EU-
US comparison and attributable to MFP (see Table 1), is confirmed in the intra-
European context: the main disparity in labor productivity growth between 
individual European economies is to be found not in differences in the intensity 
of the production factors, but in multifactor productivity. Indeed, the standard 
deviation of MFP (39.15%) is quite larger than that of the contribution of 
labour composition (6.99%) or of capital deepening ICT (16.37%) (see Table 
4). Substantial differentials also arise at country-sectoral level.  
 1 
 
FIGURE 2 
Labour productivity: levels and growth rates (Average annual growth rate 1995-2005) 
Primary Sectors (Agriculture and Mining) corr =-0.29 Industry (Manufacturing and Energy sectors) corr =-0.12 
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FIGURE 2- Continued 
Labour productivity: levels and growth rates (Average annual growth rate 1995-2005) 
Hotels and Restaurants corr=-0.06 Transport, Storage and Communications corr=0.08 
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FIGURE 3: Contributions of MFP to growth of sectoral added value 
European Economy 1995-2005 
Primary Sectors (Agriculture and Mining) Industry (Manufacturing and Energy sectors) 
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FIGURE 3: Contributions of MFP to growth of sectoral added value 
European Economy 1995-2005 (continued) 
Hotels and Restaurants Transport, Storage and Communications 
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One general finding, common to almost all the countries, is the positive change of MFP 
in Industry, i.e. in manufacturing and energy sectors (as shown in Figure 3). For a 
plausible explanation one has to recall that MFP, as a residual measure, includes 
measurement errors, and R&D and other intangible assets are the more prominent 
examples causing statistical errors when computing inputs. This component, as shown in 
Figure 4, has a great importance in industry and it is worth noting that, on average, in 
EU12, its cumulated growth over the decade is of more than 30%.19 
 
Figure 4: R&D 1995-2005 in EU countries 
(as percentages of sectoral value added) 
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT. Of our sample of 16 EU countres Austria, 
Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia are not included  
 
A second finding concerns the positive contribution of MFP to productivity growth in the 
Wholesale and Retail sector. One likely explanation, as stressed in van Ark et al. (2008), 
is that the ample diffusion of chain stores and inventory systems applied to the trade 
sector are prominent examples of sectors where returns to scale, as already observed for 
the American economy (Foster et al., 2006), have played a significant role and explain 
faster growth in MFP. 
Good performances have also been found in Transport, Storage and Communications. 
One reason for this finding concerns the role of deregulation and of changes in entry 
barriers, since the removal of restrictions encourages innovation and promotes growth 
(Aghion and Griffith, 2005). These impacts had been empirically tested by Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003), who examined the role of entry liberalization in market services and 
                                               
19Data concerning R&D expenses are not available for all countries and sectors of our sample. 
The averages presented in Figure 4 are thus obtained without considering Austria, Hungary, 
Portugal and Slovenia, and without including the primary sector. 
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found a spill -over positive effect on manufacturing, but, unexpectedly, no benefits in 
services.  
These paradoxical results may be due to some statistical problems since in Europe 
deregulations have been introduced in different times in different industries, but their 
aggregation in broad sectors does not permit to isolate the single institutional innovation 
and causes an insufficient change over time of the explanatory variables which represent 
these innovations. Inklaar et al. (2008) signal that moving to a more detailed analysis for 
individual service sectors is convenient since it overcomes these problems; in particular, 
for Post and Telecommunications, the authors document that the effect of barriers to 
entry has a negative and significant impact on MFP growth, whereas no significant 
effects are detected for Transport and Storage. An explanation offered is “that the change 
in barriers to entry for the post telecommunication services was so strong that its effects 
became identifiable through the general noise in the data, while this was not the case in 
transport” (Inklaar, et al. 2008, p. 167). In our study, where the two sectors (Transport 
and Storage and Post and Telecommunications) are not considered separately, we simply 
find, on average, good results in terms of MFP growth in various countries, as shown in 
Figure 3. 
Performances recorded in other services, such as hotels and restaurants or financial 
sectors, are more disappointing. In these cases, some failures due to the increasing use of 
fixed-terms contracts may have been some of those organisational and institutional 
changes behind the MFP patterns. This point is examined in the next section. 
 
3.4 MFP and labour regulation 
When looking at the above growth accounts from the perspective of labour utilisation and 
regulation, we focus on the summed contributions of distinct groups of factors: i) 
diffusion of fixed-term, of part-time contracts and of overtime; ii) regulation and 
restrictions of these arrangements; iii) other forms of labour protection related to 
collective relations.  
 
3.4.1 Employment contracts  
Fixed-term contracts 
In the case of rigid regulations for permanent employees, fixed-term contracts play the 
role of ‘buffer stock’; their importance is thus conditioned by several crucial factors such 
as the role of firing and hiring costs, volatility of labour demand along the business cycle, 
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elasticity of substitution between permanent and temporary workers, and relative wages 
of permanent and fixed-term employees20.  
The diffusion of fixed-term contracts in some European countries has generated 
increasing interest, and the main theoretical predictions concern the labour demand 
effects of these contracts, as recently seen in Blanchard and Landier (2002); Cahuc and 
Postel-Vinay (2002); Goux et al. (2001)21. However, as mentioned in Section 1, the 
related implications on productivity are less well explored22.  
The spread of fixed-term contracts may exert on productivity two probable, but opposite, 
effects, as reviewed in Bassanini and Venn (2007). On one hand, they favour all 
reallocation processes triggered by shocks in technology or demand which call for faster 
adaptation and job changes. They may also have an incentive effort, under the assumption 
that fixed-term workers intend to obtain permanent positions; hence, these arrangements 
may be screen devices to select new employees, and are thus “potential ‘stepping stones’ 
to generally preferable permanent jobs” (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2004, p. 2).  
On the other hand, fixed-term contracts reduce training motivations for workers and firms 
and discourage investments in firm-specific human capital. This issue has not received 
robust empirical support, since at country level, if one excludes Spain, there are no 
significant correlations between the percentage of workers on temporary contracts and 
training activities, as shown by Bassanini et al. (2005).23 In addition, restrictions on the 
types of jobs for which these contracts are permitted, such as rules that limit these 
contracts to seasonal or occasional activities, or rules for their allowed duration, may 
influence their impacts. Within sectoral analysis, the effects of fixed-term contracts may 
                                               
20 Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) examine the Italian experience in the period 1995-2000 and focus 
on the “honeymoon effect” of labour market reforms, aimed at allowing some flexibility by 
implementing reforms at the margin, i.e., those involving fixed-term contracts but not open-end 
contracts. For the Italian case, other evidence is obtained by examining the role of exemption 
clauses exonerating small firms from job security norms (see Schivardi and Torrini 2008). 
21This literature shows that, in terms of labour demand, the discounted present value of a 
permanent contract with respect to a fixed-term one is affected, among other variables, by the 
separation rate, hiring and firing costs, and the probability for the firm of replacing its workforce 
(see Garibaldi, 2006, chapter 4). 
22
 Analysis of employment protection on productivity has been considered by Autor et al. (2007). 
This study examines the impact of dismissal costs on distorting production choices and thus on 
productivity, by considering the adoption of wrongful discharge protection by US state courts 
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. 
23
 The absence of a significant correlation is obtained "if we exclude the case of Spain - an 
obvious outlier because of the very high share of temporary labour - countries with a similar share 
of temporary workers have vastly different levels of training participation.” (Bassanini et al., 
2005, p.7). For Spain, the probability of receiving on-the- job training in 1999 was 22% lower for 
workers with fixed-term contracts than for workers with open-end contracts (Dolado et al. 2002). 
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be positive in the case of industries with a higher layoff propensity, but less beneficial 
when firms can restructure through internal adjustments (Bassanini and Venn, 2007).  
This is a matter for further investigation applying econometric estimates. Some evidence, 
in any case, is important.  
First, it is interesting to examine the increasing share of fixed-term contracts over the 
period 1995-2005 in the full sample of 16 countries of our database (Figure 5). The 
lowest values are recorded in the UK, the highest are recorded in Spain (Figure 6) which, 
conversely, has the lowest proportion of part-time contracts (Table 5). The sector with the 
highest share of fixed-term contracts is a service sector, i.e., Hotels and Restaurants 
(Figure 7). 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of proportions of fixed-term contracts 
16 European countries, 1995-2005 
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT 
 
 
Figure 6: Proportions of fixed-term by countries  
(average values 1995-2005) 
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT 
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Figure 7: Proportions of fixed-term contracts by sectors  
(16 European countries, average values 1995-2005) 
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT 
 
A description of the evolutionary trends is offered by fixed-term contract growth by 
country and sector. Figure 8 shows the falling diffusion of these labour arrangements in 
Anglo-Saxon economies, whereas they have increasing importance in services, at sectoral 
level. (Figure 9). For Hotels and Restaurants, which shows the highest incidence of fixed-
term contracts, the acceleration over the period 1995-2005 was remarkable, with 
cumulative growth of more than 70% (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 8: Growth of fixed-term contracts by countries  (average annual rate of changes, 1995-2005) 
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Figure 9: Growth of fixed-term contracts by sectors (average annual rate of changes, 1995-2005) 
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT 
 
 
Figure 10: Growth of fixed-term contracts in hotels and restaurants sector 
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT 
 
Part-time contracts 
The reasons explaining the lower productivity of part-time workers with respect to full-
time ones are examined in OECD (1999). First of all, they have high job turnover which 
lowers incentives for firms to provide training, and lower levels of compensation, which 
make it more difficult for part-time workers to finance training themselves. Indeed, “in 
most countries, well over one-half of them have job tenures of less than five years, while 
the opposite is true for full-timers. Also, at least in European Union countries for which 
data are available, “the average incidence of training for part-timers, relative to full 
timers, is around 70 per cent for men and 60 per cent for women. Most of these 
 22 
differences remain after controlling for the lower educational attainment and lower job 
tenure of part-time workers, and the fact that they tend to be found in smaller 
establishments, different sectors and have a different age structure from full-time 
workers. (OECD, 1999, p.22) 
Other explanations include minimum levels of set-time required for individual tasks, which 
turn out to be a drawback for the efficiency of part-time workers. However, these negative 
effects are less significant when part-time contracts are not related to the quality of part-
time compared with full-time jobs, but to adverse cyclical conditions. Other important 
factors concern preferences and attitudes for part-time workers and their differentials by 
gender, since the voluntary choice of this type of contract may weaken the causal link 
between these arrangements and efficiency24.  
 
Hours worked 
As mentioned above, hours worked in the European Union rose rapidly after 1995, and 
this change, by simple accounting, had a direct negative impact on per hour value-added 
growth. However, moving beyond the simple growth accounting, we need to explore the 
indirect economic impact of hours worked on productivity. 
One suggested hypothesis is the existence of a negative correlation between the growth 
rates of labour utilisation and labour productivity. For instance, Dew- Becker and Gordon 
(2008) found that an increase in total hours per capita of 1% will reduce labour 
productivity by 0.7% and within Europe, the countries with largest increases in hours also 
experienced the largest decelerations in productivity growth and comparable findings are 
obtained by other studies, surveyed in OECD (2007). 
A plausible interpretation is that an increase of work intensity may cause diminishing 
returns when it is obtained with longer hours of work, mainly offered by less skilled 
employees and whose competences are less firm-specific. Also, an increase of labour 
utilisation may concern worse jobs and tasks of inferior quality. In those cases, the 
‘composition effect’ of employment or deterioration of quality of jobs may cause an 
overall shift towards worse productivity outcomes.  
A simple graphical representation of weekly hours worked by country and sectors is 
offered by Figure 11.  
 
                                               
24
 See also EUROSTAT (1997) which focuses on part-time arrangements in the European Union.  
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Figure 11: Weekly hours worked by country and sector in EU countries, 
average annual growth rates 1995-2005  
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT data. 
A summary of fixed-term and part time contracts, weekly hours worked by countries is 
given in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Fixed-term, part-time contracts, weekly hours 
worked
 
Growth 
rate of 
fixed-term 
contracts 
Growth rate 
of part-time 
contracts  
Growth 
rate of 
average 
number of 
weekly 
hours of 
work 
Share of  
workers 
with fixed-
term 
contract 
out total 
workers 
Share of 
part-time 
workers 
out total 
workers 
Growth 
rate of 
average 
number of 
weekly 
hours of 
work 
Austria 4.52 4.81 0.21 8.05 17.12 0.21 
Belgium 5.92 5.64 0.02 8.17 17.70 0.02 
Denmark -2.15 1.48 0.31 9.94 21.43 0.31 
Finland 2.04 3.46 0.08 17.29 12.29 0.08 
France 2.79 2.12 -0.73 13.91 16.62 -0.73 
Germany 3.36 4.69 0.09 12.59 19.62 0.09 
Ireland -4.51 8.32 -0.55 6.02 14.28 -0.55 
Italy 7.31 8.03 0.07 10.33 8.79 0.07 
Netherlands 6.29 3.89 0.58 13.15 41.53 0.58 
Portugal 9.01 5.25 -0.55 18.18 9.86 -0.55 
Spain 4.90 8.92 0.34 34.54 8.60 0.34 
Sweden 3.53 0.41 0.46 14.91 23.00 0.46 
United 
Kingdom -0.82 1.34 -0.31 6.46 25.06 -0.31 
UE13 3.25 4.49 0.00 13.35 18.15 0.00 
Czech 
Republic 1.58 0.02 -0.49 8.06 5.21 -0.49 
Hungary 2.10 -0.17 -0.33 6.85 3.55 -0.33 
Slovenia 8.87 -0.16 0.03 13.79 7.15 0.03 
 
 
Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT data. 
 
3.4.2 Labour collective relations  
We mentioned above the role of restrictions on employment contracts, but other 
institutions, related to labour collective relations, are likely to have impacts on 
productivity growth.  
A parallel dimension of industrial relations climate concerns bargaining governability, as 
measured by our collective relation indexes. It can be assumed that in coordinate market 
economies, extensive relational and long terms contracts entail more reliance on 
collaborative relationship and on the exchange of private information. Hence, labour 
regulation may favour and amplify the potentialities and fruitful effects of investments in 
intangible assets and of R&D efforts. 
We utilize additional indexes for collective rules that discipline unionized actions25. 
Indeed, workers’ position inside the firm is dependent on those provisions that regulate 
                                               
25
 Finally, a third indicator that measures various social security provisions has been introduced in 
the study of Botero et al. (2004). 
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hiring, working time and dismissal conditions (summed up into an employment laws 
index), but also on employees’ contractual strength, empowered by collective actions 
(synthesized by a collective relations laws index). 
In a recent survey, Freeman (2007, p.1) identifies “three ways in which institutions affect 
economic performance: by altering incentives, by facilitating efficient bargaining, and by 
increasing information, communication, and trust”. Far from offering a detailed 
description of the multiple channels that can produce these impacts, it must be recalled 
that a “two faces approach”, originally proposed by Freeman and Medoff (1984) for the 
role of unions, and recently reassessed by Bertola (2008), might be advocated..26 
Labour market regulation offers remedies for market imperfections, as regards provisions 
of insurance, job seeking and training incentives. Hence, the good face emphasizes that 
labour protection, through collective bargaining and provisions that favour long-term 
relations encourage firm specific human capital investments and stimulate growth. Other 
arrangements, such as legal institutions of codetermination, giving ‘voice’ to employees, 
as explained in Section 1, enhance the efficiency of the firm by permitting the flows of 
communications between management and workers (Freeman and Lazear, 1995).  
The “bad” face proposes the opposite thesis: labour interventions obstruct the free labour 
market functioning, foster rent seeking, disturb efficient reallocation processes, and 
generate worse labour market outcomes. Benefits of labour regulation are thus 
counterbalanced by costs; for instance, as stressed by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), 
employment protection prevents reallocation of labour and thus reduces efficiency. In our 
perspective, we ask whether labour institutions, by improving the functioning of labour 
markets, end to favouring productivity growth. Some evidence is shown in the next 
subsection.  
From the collective relations laws we selected, as mentioned in Section 2, two indicators: 
the labour union power and a collective disputes index. A summary of European 
employment laws and collective relations laws considered in our estimates are reported in 
Table 6. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
26
 For the debate on institutions and labour market flexibility, see Nickell and Layard (1999). 
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Table 6: Labour regulation in European economies 
 
 
Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT and Botero et al. (2004) databases. 
 
As on can see, according to the union power index, the polarization in Europe between 
opposite situations, as those represented, for instance, by UK and Germany clearly 
reflects some well-known differences between distinct regimes of institutional labour 
arrangements which a huge literature has compared in many surveys.  
For instance, in Germany, reforms have been carried out by unions, employers’ 
associations, firms, works councils, without a significant role for legal interventions.  
Internal restructuring has been obtained via flexible working times and labour mobility 
negotiated with unions, with company-level pacts, adopted in nearly half of the largest 
German companies . Half of these pacts, have been productivity pacts, aimed at adjusting 
working conditions, and involving “the extension of working hours (in most cases 
without wage compensation), measures against absenteeism, changes in work 
organization” (Hassel and Rehder 2001).  
The German restructuring process, “has entailed increased consensus-based decision 
making in firms with works council chairs playing a greater role in co-
Protection of 
fixed-term 
contracts
Protection 
of part-time 
contracts
Cost of 
increasing 
hours worked
Labour union 
power
Protection of 
workers during 
collective 
disputes
Austria 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,29
Belgium 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,42
Denmark 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,71 0,13
Finland 0,69 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,21
France 0,88 0,50 1,00 0,67 0,67
Germany 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,71 0,50
Ireland 0,00 1,00 0,04 0,43 0,50
Italy 0,94 0,50 1,00 0,43 0,83
Netherlands 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,50
Portugal 0,81 1,00 1,00 0,71 0,58
Spain 1,00 0,81 1,00 0,71 0,46
Sweden 0,44 1,00 1,00 0,62 0,46
United Kingdom 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,38
UE13 0,44 0,91 0,85 0,52 0,46
Czech Republic 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,43 0,43
Hungary 0,19 1,00 0,28 0,71 0,50
Slovenia 0,38 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,54
* Higher values correspond to more extensive legal protection of workers
13 Old member states
3 New Member States
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management”(Carlin and Soskice, 2007, p. 4). These changes do not apply in the UK, 
featuring liberalizing economic reforms.  
For the full sample of the sixteen economies considered, Table 6 and Figure 12 provide 
two main results. First, there are substantial differentials between European economies in 
the labour regulation of employment contracts and collective relations rules, with 
Portugal and Spain showing the highest protection and the UK the lowest. Second, there 
is also substantial disparity in the composition of this regulation; for instance, the rigidity 
of fixed-term contract legislation is higher in France, Italy and Spain, which have the 
most stringent regulations; conversely a Nordic country like Sweden, which permits freer 
use of fixed-term contracts, has clearly defined rules for collective relations and more 
stringent provisions for part-time contracts.  
 
Figure 12: Summary index of Labour Regulation and its components 
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Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
 
However, the measure of protection of workers confirms that European capitalism is 
quite heterogeneous in terms of labour regulation.  
Additional issues concern institutional interactions between employment regulation and 
other provisions, such as those governing wage setting. As known, employment 
protection increases the bargaining power of insiders, but reduces their fallback option 
because it lowers the probability of being re-employed for unemployed workers, with an 
ambiguous final effect on wage outcomes (Boeri and Van Ours, 2008, chapter 10).  
In our context, in which some causal links between institutional complementarities and 
MFP differentials are examined, these general assumptions need to be further explored. 
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4. Econometric results 
The present section is devoted to estimate the main determinants of MFP growth over the 
period 1995-2005, and to explain sectoral-countries differentials. As briefly mentioned 
above, in addition to technical innovation, other explanatory variables must to be taken 
into account: organisational and institutional changes and unmeasured inputs (see the 
Appendix, Table A2, for a more detailed variables description). 
The focus of the following investigation is distinguishing, among these variables, three 
different sets which can capture the role of some of these driving forces. 
The first group refers to organizational variables in labour relationship measured by the 
growth rates of fixed term contracts, of part time contracts, and of costs of increasing 
hours worked (extensive and intensive margin labour utilisation). The second group 
concerns institutional variables related to labour protection of these arrangements and to 
collective relations, such as union power and protection of workers during collective 
disputes (see Appendix for a full description of this database). The third determinant of 
MFP, captured by a single explanatory variable, refers to one of the main components of 
unmeasured inputs, i.e. R&D expenses.  
In order to analyse the impact on MFP (disaggregated at sectoral level) of labour 
protection laws (available at country level), we carried out the simplest version of the 
difference-in-difference econometric approach. More precisely, following Bassanini et al. 
(2008), we assumed that the difference in MFP growth between any pair of industries is 
equal to the expected value (E) of a function of labour protection measures (LP), 
multiplied by a function g of the difference between the labour flexibility propensities of 
the two industries27: 
 
))((]lnln[ zihtziktzitihtikt gLPfMFPMFPE Λ−Λ=∆−∆  
where iktMFP  denotes Multifactor productivity in industry j, country i and time t; k, and 
h index the pair of industries; z  indexes labour regulation measures; Λ  indexes the size 
                                               
27We omitted the change in LP over time (included by Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn 2008, p.14). 
This omission is explained by two main reasons. First, some of our labour regulation measures 
(those related to collective relations) did not change over the short period examined here. Second, 
change rates in labour protection, as used by Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2008), showed little 
variability and their relative estimated coefficients were always non significant in the regressions 
performed. Conversely, our Λ parameters not only changed over sectors, but also showed 
variability both over sector-country and time, and improved the informational and interpretative 
power of our estimates.  
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of the labour flexibility component which is protected (share of fixed-term and part-time 
contracts on total employment, growth rate of increasing hours worked, share of 
employees on total employment, share of workers involved in industrial disputes). 
We also assumed that f is linear and g is an identity function g(x) = x. In addition, our 
linear regression model included other organisational variables captured by the growth 
rate of fixed-term and part-time contracts, and innovation proxied by R&D. These last 
variables are taken at sector-country level and also work as controls. Thus, we estimated 
the following equation: 
 
sttsst
n
st
z
it
z
ijtst DDDROVLPMFP ε+++++Λ=∆ &ln  
where s = 128 sector-country units (16 countries x 8 sectors); t = 1995,…2005; i = 16 
countries; j = 8 sectors; z = 1,…5 (protection of fixed-term contracts, of part-time, costs 
of increasing hours worked, union power, collective disputes). We also included 
unmeasured innovative inputs (captured by R&D), sD , sector-country dummies (fixed 
effects) and tD , year dummies to control for highly sector-specific factors (and for their 
changes over the period) which have probably influenced MFP growth and which cannot 
be captured by means of the labour policy control variables included in our analysis. For 
instance, product market regulatory environments tend to be associated with restrictive 
regulations in labour markets28 and should be included as determinants of MFP. 
However, sectoral-country indicators for product markets restrictive regulations are not 
available at the same sectoral level of disaggregation of other employment protection 
measures and are omitted.29.  
It must be remarked that specific tests stressed both heteroskedasticity across panels and 
autocorrelation within panels and for that reason we fitted panel-data linear model by 
using the feasible generalized least squares method30. The results obtained are shown in 
Table 7. 
                                               
28
 Nicoletti et al. (2001) for the OECD countries found that the indicators for product and labour 
market restrictive regulations were closely associated, with a statistical correlation of 0.73, 
significant at the 1% level. 
29
 For instance, for non manufacturing sectors, OECD Indicators of Regulation have been 
calculated for 41 ISIC rev3 sectors in 21 OECD countries over the period 1975 to 2003, these 
aggregations must to be re-classified to match them with non manufacturing sectors included in 
our database and obtained from the NACE rev.1 sections. Matching these indexes is an issue of 
future research. 
30
 All estimations are performed by means of STATA 10. Routines adopted, preliminary and 
post-estimation tests are available upon request. 
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The results obtained confirm not only the positive strategical role of R&D, but also the 
negative impact of fixed term arrangements which can discourage training and 
acquisitions of firm specific skills. Conversely, in those sectors-countries where the 
magnitude of fixed-term contracts is significant, stricter regulation of this contractual 
form influences MFP positively (see the coefficient of the interaction term “protection of 
fixed-term contracts x proportion of fixed-term contracts”). In other words, labour 
provisions for protection of fixed-term agreements may offset the negative effects due to 
a pure increase in these arrangements, reversing the slow pattern of accumulation of job-
related training due to short-term positions. 
On the other hand, labour provisions for protection of fixed-term workers may offset 
these negative effects and reverse the slow pattern of accumulation of job related training 
due to short term positions31. By contrast, no significant effects are obtained for part-time 
occupations, and after all, as emphasized in OECD (1999, p. 21), “There are few 
theoretical reasons to expect the productivity per hour of a part-time worker to be lower 
than the productivity of a full-time worker, other things being equal”. In any case their 
protection resulted only partially having a positive and significant effect. 
The role of growth rates of annual average of the actual weekly hours and of their costs 
has revealed not significant, whereas the role of regulation of collective relations seems 
more ambiguous. The impact of defensive clauses in confrontational environments, as 
measured by protection of workers during collective disputes, is not significant, while 
union power, an index that sums up various institutional devices, play some significant 
and positive role in encouraging pro-productivity practices, but only in some 
specifications. A result which calls for a deeper inquiry and for a better distinction 
between payoffs rights (wage bargaining) and decision rights (codetermination and 
workers councils) and of their impacts in productivity performances. 
 
 
 
                                               
31 As said above (Section 1, note 8), the dataset used in our study for labour employment 
regulation, aimed at estimating its influence on organizational changes and MFP, does not exactly 
coincide with the OECD EPL index. However, for the component belonging to both datasets, i.e., 
fixed-tem contract regulation, the correlation is very high (r=0.81). The main difference is that the 
OECD index includes the maximum number of successive contracts, and uses a different 
weighting procedure and different cardinal summary values. In any case, the inclusion of the 
OECD indicator in econometric estimates does not alter our main findings. All estimates are 
available upon request. 
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Table 7: Labour market protection and MFP at country-sector level  
(panel data fitted with Feasible Generalised Least Squares) 
Obs. 924 924 924 924 924 
Groups 84 84 84 84 84 
      
Dependent Variable: TFP 
(growth rate)      
Explanatory variables      
Organizational variables 
     
Growth of fixed -term contracts  -0.008*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) 
Growth of part-time contracts  0,002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,006) 
Cost of increasing hours 
worked * growth of weekly 
hours worked  
  -0,014 -0,018 -0,025 
   (0,019) (0,019) (0,022) 
Institutional variables      
Protection of fixed-term 
Contracts   x  
Proportion of  fixed term 
contracts 
 0.525*** 0.488*** 0.516*** 0.614*** 
  
(0,098) (0,102) (0,108) (0,103) 
 
Protection of part-time 
contracts  x  
Growth of part-time contracts   
 0.108* 0.103* 0.092 0.142* 
  (0,058) (0,058) (0,058) (0,077) 
 
Union Power  x  %employees 
out of total employment  
   0.281*** -0.125 
    (0,129) (0,129) 
Collective disputes  
X  % employees involved in 
disputes 
    0.000 
     (0,004) 
Unmeasured inputs 
     
R&D 1.501*** 1.588*** 1.599*** 1.590*** 1.313*** 
 (0.342) (0.339) (0.342) (0.339) (0.335) 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Sector-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
     
Constant 87.917*** 67.600*** 64.321*** 51,115*** 99.379*** 
 (4.398) (5.324) (6.104) (10.144) (2.128) 
Wald chi2 821.8 984.64 971.98 1158.9 921.21 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
 
5. Conclusions 
Many cross -national diversities are still prevailing, not withstanding the indisputable 
converging trends in a ‘market’ direction. How deep are their differentials in terms of 
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growth and are the so called “market reliant countries” more successful in terms of 
productivity performances?  
Although more research is needed to explore this issue, some preliminary findings have 
been obtained. First of all, there is a large variation in labour productivity and its 
components across European economies. A major portion of these differentials are found 
in multifactor productivity, while labour composition has played a minor role (as shown 
in Table 4). We find that since 1995 European countries have not followed similar 
patterns of growth and that further heterogeneity are caused by sectoral diversities: 
between-sector gaps are crucial and the worst performances of multifactor productivity 
are recorded in some service sectors (see Figure 3). As recalled by van Ark et al. (2008), 
Baumol spoke about the “cost disease of the service sector”, a sector which is inherently 
labour-intensive. But are the cost and the magnitude of this disease uniform all over the 
countries? Which labour institutions are better performing?  
Our empirical estimates offer some answers: shorter term jobs and lower employment 
tenures may discourage investments in skills, while labour regulation and wage setting 
rules, which sustain long term relationship, may present some advantages and could 
outperform short term oriented arrangements on the grounds of collaborative relations 
and bargaining governability (see Table 5).  
These findings appear as a confirmation of other recent studies, such as Dew-Becker and 
Gordon (2008), which shows that within Europe a reduction in employment protection 
caused a decline in productivity growth, offsetting the benefit of higher employment. The 
present study, including the sectoral dimension, shows that in labour intensive sectors, 
and where propensities to use flexible labour arrangements are higher, some forms of 
labour regulation mitigate the perverse effects of these arrangements on MFP.  
These results call for additional support and point to incentives for further research, 
fruitfully enriched by a more dimensional perspective. Indeed, the four better performers 
of our sample (Ireland, UK, Finland and Sweden) belong to different varieties of 
capitalism, featuring neither the same market-reliant arrangements, nor the same sectoral 
fields of specialisation. In addition, in an enlarged perspective, complementarities in 
labour, financial and product market regulation should be taken into account with the 
main intent of discovering their impact on growth. The present study is only a first step in 
this direction.  
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 APPENDIX 
FIGURE A.1: Labour productivity (hourly) and hours worked by sector (Average annual growth rate 1995-2005) 
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FIGURE A.1: Labour productivity (hourly) and hours worked by sectors (Average annual growth rate 1995-2005) (continued) 
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 Table A1: Description of variables 
 
MFP (growth 
rate) Growth rate of Total Factor Productivity (sectoral-country data) Source: EU KLEMS database 
Fixed-term 
Contracts  
(growth rate) 
Growth rate of Fixed-Term Contracts (sectoral-country data) 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
Part-time 
contracts  
(growth rate) 
Growth rate of Part-Time Contracts (sectoral-country data) 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
Hours worked 
(growth rate) 
Growth of weekly hours worked (sectoral-country data) 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
O
rg
an
isa
tio
n
al
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Protection of 
fixed- term 
contracts 
Protection of fixed-term contracts:  
Degree of protection of fixed-term contracts x proportion of fixed-term contracts 
 
Degree of protection of fixed-term contracts (country data) 
It measures the cost of fixed-term contracts, computed as the average of two variables. The first one  
equals one if fixed-term contracts are allowed only: (1) for jobs that are temporary by nature; (2) for 
temporary vacancies to replace a permanent worker in maternity or sickness leave; (3) for training 
contracts; (4) for seasonal work; and/or (5) if the law expressly states that the will of the parties 
involved in the contract is not a good enough reason for entering into a fixed-term contract. Equals 
zero otherwise.The second variable is the normalised maximum duration of fixed-term contracts. 
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al. (2004)  
Proportion of fixed-term contracts 
Incidence of workers with fixed-term contracts on total employment 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
In
st
itu
tio
n
al
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
 Protection of 
part-time 
contracts 
Protection of Part-Time contracts:  
Degree of protection of part-time contracts x  proportion of part-time contracts 
 
Degree of protection of part-time contracts (country data) 
It measures the existence and cost of part-time contracts computed as the average of 1) a dummy 
variable equal to one, if part-time workers enjoy the mandatory benefits of full-time workers, 2) a 
dummy variable equal to one, if terminating part-time workers is at least as costly as terminating 
full-time workers.  
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al. (2004)  
Proportion of part-time contracts (sectoral-country data) 
Incidence of workers with part-time contracts on total employment 
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Cost of increasing 
 hours worked 
 
Cost of Overtime x Growth of weekly hours worked 
  
Cost of overtime (country data) 
The cost of overtime measures the cost of increasing hours worked obtained by calculating the 
“normal” hours of work per year in each country (excluding overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.). 
When the hours worked exceed this maximum, a firm uses overtime.  
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al. (2004)  
 
Growth of weekly hours worked (sectoral-country data) 
 
Union Power 
Index 
Degree of protection and bargaining  power of unions x proportion of employees 
 
Degree of protection and bargaining  power of unions (country data) 
It is computed as the average of the following seven dummy variables which are one: 1) if 
employees have the right to unionise, 2) if employees have the right to collective bargaining, 3) if 
employees have the legal duty to bargain with unions, 4) if collective contracts are extended to third 
parties by law, 5) if the law allows closed shops, 6) if workers, or unions, or both, have the right to 
appoint members to the Boards of Directors, 7) if workers’ councils are mandated by law.  
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al. (2004)  
Proportion of employees (sectoral-country data) 
Incidence of employees on total employment 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
 
Collective 
disputes Index 
Protection of workers during collective disputes:  
Protection of collective disputes x proportion of workers involved in collective disputes 
 
Protection of collective disputes (country data) 
This indicator is computed as the average of the following eight dummy variables which are one: 1) 
if employer lockouts are illegal, 2) if workers have the right to industrial action, 3) if wildcat, 
political, and sympathy/solidarity/ secondary strikes are legal, 4) if there is no mandatory waiting 
period or notification requirement before strikes can occur, 5) if striking is legal even if there is a 
collective agreement in force, 6) if laws do not mandate conciliation procedures before a strike, 7) if 
third-party arbitration during a labour dispute is mandated by law, 8) if it is illegal to fire or replace 
striking workers. 
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al. (2004)  
 
U
n
m
ea
su
re
d 
In
pu
ts
 
R&D Sectoral R&D expenses standardised to value added Source: EUROSTAT 
 
